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ABSTRACT 
Many households in developing countries often engage in self-generation to mitigate the impacts of 
poor public electricity provision. What is less well known, however, is whether (and how) self-generation 
influences households’ willingness to pay (WTP) for service reliability. Using data collected from a sample of 
Nigerian households, the results reveal that engagement in self-generation is positively correlated with WTP for 
reliability. This is despite the fact that self-generation reduces the negative welfare impact of unreliability. 
Further analyses, however, show that backup households’ decisions to pay a higher amount than non-backup 
households are influenced by the costs of self-generation: an increase of N1 (US$0.006) in self-generation’s fuel 
cost per-hour is associated with WTP about N5.22 (US$0.032) more in the monthly bill. However, households’ 
WTP US$0.15–0.16/kWh of improved reliability is smaller than the marginal costs of reliability from self-
generation – US$0.27–0.41/kWh. We conclude by discussing the policy implications of our findings. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the importance of reliable energy services to consumer welfare, access to uninterrupted 
electricity services remains a critical problem facing households in Nigeria. Currently, the average Nigerian 
household experiences power outages for around 19 hours daily (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2012). 
The poor electricity situation in the country is generally attributed to the inadequate financing of generation and 
distribution capacities due to poor patronage by private investors (Presidential Task Force on Power 2011; Nnaji 
2010).1 Private investors are reluctant to invest in the power sector because the highly subsidised tariff system 
currently operating in the country does not guarantee a return on investment.  
For most Nigerians, tackling the poor electricity supply means the installation of private backup 
generators.2,3 Recent estimates indicate that approximately one in four Nigerian homes has a gasoline- or diesel-
powered generator (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 2012). According to the Global Business Research 
Institute, around US$450 million was spent on the importation of backup generators in 2011, and this amount is 
expected to more than double by 2020 (Mgbeokwere 2013). This implies that the amount spent on the 
importation of diesel-powered generators in 2011 was equivalent to approximately 26 per cent of the sales value 
of the publicly provided electricity in that year. Although backup generators installed by households could 
reduce the welfare losses (e.g., reduction in food spoilage) associated with poor reliability, they can also cause 
serious environmental and health problems due to carbon emissions, and there is evidence of deaths directly 
linked to the smoke emanating from backup generators in Nigerian homes (Ogundipe 2013).4  
Finding a permanent solution to the low-quality power supply in Nigeria, as for many other developing 
countries, would require huge investments in both the grid and off-grid (e.g., solar PV plus storage and wind) 
generation, and an upgrade of the transmission and distribution facilities. Such investments would, however, 
require active participation by private investors, especially given the recent decline in government revenue 
owing to the rapid decrease in oil prices. However, ensuring private investors’ active participation in the power 
sector would require an increase in tariffs and the use of a cost-reflective pricing system that guarantees a return 
on investment (Newbery 2002). Thus, there is no doubt that the formulation of effective policies to improve 
																																								 																				
1 Between 1995 and 2013, for instance, less than 700MW of generation capacity was added to the Nigerian electricity grid. See: 
www.eia.gov.  
2 Although there are other coping strategies often employed by households for lighting, including kerosene lamps, lanterns, and candles, the 
closest substitute for grid electricity is backup generators. Only backup generators can be used to power household appliances such as 
televisions and refrigerators. 
3 ‘Backup generation’ and ‘self-generation’ are used interchangeably in this study. 
4 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/10/portable-generators-standby-power-standby-death/. 
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supply security at cost-reflective tariffs would arguably require: 1) outage cost estimations, which are 
particularly important for comparing costs to benefits when deciding on investments to improve quality of 
service; and 2) an evaluation of whether or not consumers would be willing to pay, especially given the high 
rates of backup adoption, which serves as the common close substitute for public provision.  
This study estimates the costs of power outages to Nigerian households, and then evaluates the extent 
to which these costs might affect their WTP. Specifically, the study aims to answer the following questions: 
Would Nigerian households be willing to pay for improved reliability and, if so, how much? What are the 
determinants of households’ backup generator adoption? Then, conditional on backup generator ownership: 
What is the household’s response to the proposed reliability-bill trade-offs? How much does it cost a household 
to self-generate electricity, and how does the self-generation cost (i.e., outage cost) relate to their WTP for 
improved grid service reliability?  
The present study is justified for several reasons. First, although a large number of studies have 
investigated consumers’ WTP for energy services in many countries (see Abdullah and Jeanty, 2011; Abdullah 
and Mariel, 2010; An et al., 2002; Munasinghe, 1980; Nomura and Akai, 2004; Roe and Teisl et al., 2001 for 
examples), analysis of WTP for electricity services in Nigeria is limited. 5  Second, previous studies have 
concentrated mainly on how service attributes and socioeconomic characteristics of consumers affect their 
WTP; the extent to which the coping strategies (especially self-generation, being the popular close substitute for 
public provision in the country) might affect WTP has not yet been explored. Third, we collect new and more 
granular data that allows us to compute how much it costs a household to self-generate electricity and how that 
cost (outage cost) relates to their WTP for improved reliability. Our study combines the strengths of both the 
revealed and stated preference methods to estimate the interruption costs for households and their WTP. In 
addition, we investigate the factors underlying the behaviours of households in their attempts to mitigate outage 
losses through backup generation. Also, the survey technique enables us to measure the impact of outage costs 
on WTP. Lastly, we combine both the traditional maximum likelihood estimator (double-bounded model) and 
matching methods to examine how a household’s engagement in self-generation might influence its WTP. We 
																																								 																				
5 Otegbulu (2011) studied consumers’ WTP for improved electricity services in some selected local government areas of Lagos State. Due to 
poor electricity supply in the country, the study found that 40–80 per cent of households used generators daily. He also reported that more 
than 80 per cent of the sampled households were willing to pay more for electricity. However, the study did not examine whether WTP 
differed between backup and non-backup households. Moreover, the study could not offer a clear and robust estimate of how much people 
were willing to pay per unit for improvements in supply. Furthermore, the study relied heavily on descriptive analyses and could not provide 
the details of the factors that might be responsible for variations in consumers’ WTP.  
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find that backup households’ engagement in self-generation positively influences WTP for service reliability, 
despite the fact that backup generation reduces the negative welfare impacts of unreliability.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief review of literature on the 
methodology for valuing reliability. Section 3 describes the data used for the study. The determinants of 
households’ adoption of backup generators are examined in Section 4. Section 5 deals with the analysis of WTP 
and its relationship with self-generation. In Section 6, we estimate the marginal outage costs and explore the link 
between self-generation costs and WTP. The last section concludes and discusses the policy implications of our 
findings.  
2. BRIEF REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING 
RELIABILITY 
 
In principle, there are broadly three different techniques that can be used to estimate the cost of power 
outages to residential consumers.6 The first approach directly asks consumers to state the costs of various types 
of outages (see for example Wacker and Billinton, 1989). The second is to use a revealed preference approach. 
This involves studying the actual behaviour of households in terms of action taken to mitigate the effect of 
power outages. The principle of revealed preference implies that the cost of an outage may be inferred from the 
actions taken by consumers to mitigate losses induced by unsupplied electricity. For instance, a consumer might 
invest in backup generation in order to mitigate the effects of power unreliability on their welfare. Such 
investment is then used to compute the cost of outage to the consumer. This method has been extensively used 
to estimate the cost of unreliability to business enterprises (see for example Adenikinju, 2003; Beenstock, 
Goldin, and Haitovsky, 1997; Bental and Ravid, 1982; Caves, Herriges, and Windle, 1992; Matsukawa and 
Fujii, 1994; Oseni and Pollitt, 2013), but has rarely been explored in the valuation of reliability to households – 
this is probably due to data limitation at household level. The third approach is to directly or indirectly elicit 
information on consumers’ WTP to avoid blackouts by using a stated preference approach (see for example 
Abdullah and Mariel, 2010; Beenstock, Goldin, and Haitovsky, 1998; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008; Carson 
and Groves, 2007; Layton and Moeltner, 2005).  
There are clearly strengths and weaknesses of each of these techniques. For example, while the stated 
preference technique considers all welfare effects by including non-monetary values of power outages on 
																																								 																				
6 Caves, Herriges, and Windle (1990) and Woo and Pupp (1992) summarize the outage estimation methods commonly used in the outage cost 
estimation literature. 
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consumers’ utility, 7  it is often criticised for suffering from a number of behavioural biases including 
hypothetical bias, sequencing or question order effect, the starting-point bias (anchoring effect) and status quo 
problem (Hartman, Doane, and Woo, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). However, some of these biases can 
be mitigated through careful survey design and implementation (Blumenschein, Johannesson, Blomquist, Liljas, 
and O’Conor, 1998; Blumenschein, Johannesson, Yokoyama, and Freeman, 2001; Longo, Hoyos, and 
Markandya, 2015). One advantage of the revealed preference technique is that it estimates the cost of power 
reliability or service quality from the actions already taken by consumers; therefore, it is not subject to bias 
under subjective evaluation. Our study combines the benefits of the stated and the revealed preferences in 
estimating the costs of reliability to Nigerian households.  
 
3. DATA 
 
The data used for this study was obtained through a survey of Nigerian households in 2013. This 
section discusses in detail the survey procedures, including the scope and size of the sample, questionnaire 
design, and household selection. 
3.1 Sample Scope and Size 
While it would be of great interest to conduct a national survey, the available resources were 
inadequate to carry out such an elaborate study. Constrained by resources – human, financial and time – this 
survey was limited to two states in southwest Nigeria: Lagos and Osun. Lagos was selected due to its economic 
and ethnic diversity, and because it is the most commercial city in Nigeria, whereas Osun was chosen due to its 
relatively modest economic characteristics.8 In 2010 purchasing power parity (PPP) prices for instance, the per 
capita income (GDP per capita) for Lagos was US$3,362.25, whereas Osun State had a per capita income of 
US$1,938.44 – just a little above the national average of US$1,806.01.9 In each of the states, three local 
government areas (LGAs) were selected from the three existing senatorial districts. These included the Ifako-
Ijaiye, Kosofe and Surulere LGAs in Lagos State and the Ife Central, Iwo and Osogbo LGAs in Osun State.  
																																								 																				
7 An example of non-monetary value of outage cost is when an individual is prevented from enjoying their leisure time (e.g., watching 
favourite programs on TV) or from cooking favourite meals during an outage. While these effects are not traded and do not have direct 
monetary valuation, they do negatively impact consumers' welfare. 
8 Lagos is the former capital city of Nigeria, and, as a result of this status, it has attracted significant economic and commercial activity. 
Lagos is the second most populous city in Nigeria, according to the 2006 National Census, and has been reported to have the largest 
electricity consumption in Nigeria.  
9 The calculations of per capita income were based on 2009 population figures due to the inability to access 2010 figures from the state 
level. The FCT Abuja was not included in the computation of the national GDP per capita average owing to the lack of GDP data.  
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To determine the optimal sample size of the target population for our study, we followed the method 
proposed by the United Nations Statistics Division (2005). Available statistics showed that the average 
household size was 3.9 and 4.0 for Lagos and Osun respectively, while the proportions of the selected LGAs to 
the total population were 18 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. The non-response rate was set at 25 per cent 
based on the response rate from Otegbulu’s (2011) study. Using the above information, the country’s 
electrification rates of 55 per cent, assuming a 10 per cent margin of error and a 95 per cent confidence interval, 
yielded the optimal sample sizes of 673 and 703 for Lagos and Osun respectively.  
3.2 Designing the Questionnaire and Pilot Studies  
Prior to the designing of the questionnaire used, a discussion with randomly selected individuals was 
held in both Lagos and Osun in August 2011. The idea behind this focus group discussion was to gain 
knowledge of how people felt about the electricity supply situation in their areas, what might interest them in 
terms of finding a solution to the problem, and the distribution of WTP. Several questions were discussed. The 
information obtained from the discussion assisted us in designing the questionnaire, as we knew what would be 
important to include. For instance, the discussion showed that people were less concerned about who supplied 
electricity – i.e., they did not mind whether electricity was supplied by the government or private companies, as 
all they cared about was reliability. Also, the focus group discussion revealed some useful information about the 
distribution of WTP values. 
Subsequently, the questionnaire was designed and divided into three sections. The first section focused 
on consumers’ current electricity payments, outage experiences and WTP. For the WTP questions, we used the 
double-bounded contingent valuation (CV) method where respondents were asked to pay two different monetary 
values for the proposed reliability, with the second amount being contingent upon their response to the first 
value. The double-bounded dichotomous choice (DBDC) question format was used because of its advantages, 
including its robustness to cognitive and strategic biases (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008), incentive 
compatibility (Carson and Groves, 2007), efficiency (Hanemann, Loomis, and Kanninen, 1991), and robustness 
to poor bid designs (Hanemann, Loomis, and Kanninen, 1991; Hanemann and Kanninen, 1998; Scarpa and 
Bateman, 2000). However, the double-bounded contingent valuation (CV) also suffers from a number of 
behavioural biases, including hypothetical bias, sequencing or question order effect and starting-point bias 
(anchoring effect), and protest bias (Anna Alberini, Veronesi, and Cooper, 2005; Herriges and Shogren, 1996; 
Veronesi, Alberini, and Cooper, 2011). We corrected for the above mentioned biases using the methods 
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recommended by Bateman, Burgess, Hutchinson, and Matthews, (2008), Longo, Hoyos, and Markandya (2015) 
and Loomis, Brown, Lucero, and Peterson, (1996).  
The second part of the questionnaire focused on households’ socioeconomic characteristics, and the 
last section asked about respondents’ household appliances. Having designed the questionnaire, two additional 
pre-survey pilot studies were conducted. Pilot studies play an important role in social science research by 
providing information for the planning and justification of the actual survey studies; they are often used by 
practitioners to pre-test a research instrument (Baker 1994). Pilot testing ensures that a research instrument is 
used properly and the information obtained is consistent. The first pilot study was carried out during the summer 
of 2012. The pilot study involved 20 randomly selected households – 10 in each of the two states. The purpose 
of this pilot study was to ensure that respondents understood the questions. After the study, those questions that 
seemed difficult to understand were modified to use more familiar and less technical words. The last pilot study 
was conducted just two weeks before the actual study. Baker (1994) found that a sample of 10–20 per cent of 
the sample size for the actual survey was a reasonable number of participants to be enrolled on a pilot study. 
Thus, our pilot study involved 101 and 105 randomly selected households – representing 15 per cent of the 
sample sizes – from Lagos and Osun respectively.10 The idea was to validate the questionnaire.11 
 
3.3 Household Selection and Survey Administration 
The sampling frame for this study was the 2006 National Population Census. Nigeria is divided into six 
geopolitical zones, comprising 36 states plus the FCT. The states are, in turn, subdivided into 774 LGAs. For the 
national census purposes, the Nigeria Population Commission splits the country further into enumeration areas 
(EAs), each comprising several households. To avoid selection bias, the number of households selected per 
LGA was proportional to the total number of EAs in the three selected LGAs in each state.12 Households were 
then selected randomly using the systematic selection of 10 households per EA. This involved obtaining the 
total number of households listed in a particular EA and then calculating a sampling interval (SI) by dividing the 
total households listed by 10. The next step was to generate a random start (‘s’) from the table of random 
numbers that stood as the first selection. Consecutive groups of households were selected by adding the SI to 
																																								 																				
10 Given the time limitations, only around 80 per cent of the potential respondents in each state were finally contacted, of which around 70 
per cent responded. 
11	The responses were subjected to a preliminary analysis (but not included in the final analysis) in order to get a sense for how the final 
results would look.	
12 Maps of the EAs used for the last census for the selected areas were obtained from the office of the National Population Commission at 
subsidised rates. In Lagos especially, we used the maps as guides for updating the number of households in each EA during listing. In Osun, 
however, the maps were only useful for locating the areas, because the boundaries of each EA could not be properly identified. As such, we 
adopted the methodology used by the National Population Commission to create our EAs. The familiarity of the research assistants with the 
terrain made these activities less tedious.  
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‘s’. The determination of the sample size at the household level was based on previous studies by the NBS, in 
which 10 households per EA were adjudged appropriate (NBS, 2012). 
To facilitate the administration of the questionnaires, three research assistants were employed. The 
selection of these assistants was based on their previous survey experience as well as their familiarity with the 
study areas. The researchers were young graduates who had previously conducted household surveys as part of 
their undergraduate research projects. In order to improve the quality of the survey, these assistants were trained 
for two days. After training, they were examined in the field before the start of the actual survey. Finally, the 
actual survey was conducted from the end of January through to April 2013.13 The target respondents were 
heads of households (or their representatives) who were responsible for the payment of electricity bills. Out of 
the total 1,376 questionnaires administered, 1,008 were retrieved. Of the total retrieved, only 835 (representing 
61 per cent of the sampled households) were analysed due to the lack of quality responses. 
 
4.4 Survey Results 
Table 1 compares the background information of the households in our sample with the official 
estimates. Overall, the table shows that the sample estimates correspond with the official estimates, with the 
exception of marital status and gender, where it appears that we oversampled married and male respondents. 
This is not surprising, however. The survey targeted household heads (or their representatives), who are 
responsible for (or familiar with) the payment of electricity bills, whereas the official estimates were based on 
the population aged 15 years and above. Similarly, household heads are more likely to be men than women. 
Despite the similarities between the two estimates, however, we were cautious about taking the background 
information of the respondents as the approximate characteristics for all households in the states.  
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
13 We thank the following people for their support during the course of data collection: Abdulfatai Abdulazeez, Mutiu Azeez, Kazeem 
Salawu, Abdulfatai Ajide, Rafiu Ogunkemi, Kamilu Bilawu, Mutair Taiwo and Waziri Babalola.  
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Table 1: Sample Estimates and Comparable Official Statistics 
 Lagos estimates Osun estimates 
Variable Official  Sample  Official Sample  
Male (%)  51.6 59.6 47.4 55.7 
Female (%) 48.4 40.4 52.6 44.3 
Age (mean) 38.9a 43.7 38.9a 42.3 
Average household size 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.3 
Number of occupants living in a house - 14.0 - 12.6 
Number of children (<5 years) per household - 2.8 - 2.7 
Housing type (%):     Shared house/single room (%) 81.0 68.0 91.4 92.8 
Flat and others 19.0 32.0 8.6 7.2 
Household owning generator (%) - 78.1 - 33.6 
Monthly income (%)*:   §  N0–N80,000 (US$0–US$515.30) 92.5 76.3 99.4 96.7 
Over N80,000 (>US$515.30) 7.5 23.7 0.6 3.3 
Marital status: married (%) 43.0 82.0 46.0 78.6 
Prepaid customers (%) 16.6a 17.5 16.6a 4.7 
Employed (%) 92.4 84.0 82.8 86.7 
Notes: a National average;       
* 2008 estimates (there was an upward salary review in 2011);    Source: National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2009, 2010, 2012b); Presidential Task Force on Power (2012) and 
Author’s Household Survey (2013).  
 
A comparison of respondents’ background characteristics in our sample in the two states suggests that 
they were not significantly different in terms of some basic characteristics, including gender, age, number of 
children per household, household size, employment status, and ownership (or non-ownership) of a home 
business. However, they differed significantly in terms of housing type, income,14 number of occupants per 
house, hours spent at home, ownership of a backup generator, payment method (prepayment or post-payment), 
assessment of the current supply performance, and experienced service interruptions from the national grid. 
Respondents from Lagos were more likely to be rich, less likely to live in a shared house or single room, have 
more people living together in a house, experience fewer interruptions, spend fewer hours at home and are more 
likely to own a generator.  
With regards to the usage of backup generators, households in the two states do not differ significantly. 
Generators were mainly used for lighting and powering basic appliances, such as televisions, irons, fans or air 
conditioners, kettles and computers. The use of generators to power refrigerators was very limited, given the 
capacity of the generators maintained by the households in our sample. No respondents in our sample indicated 
that they used their generators to run water pumps. This is not surprising considering the small-size nature of 
																																								 																				
14 In the questionnaires, income was expressed in ranges in order to increase responses and minimise bias, as people often do not like to 
disclose their exact income.  
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backup generators held by (many) households, and given the fact that less than 1 per cent of Nigerian 
households have a water pumping machine (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2012b).  
  
4. WHAT DETERMINES HOUSEHOLDS’ BACKUP GENERATION ADOPTION? 
Despite the poor reliability of power supply in Nigeria, a significant number of households do not 
engage in self-generation. In this section, we examine the drivers of households’ engagement in self-generation. 
To evaluate the extent to which (un)reliability of power supply and household characteristics affect the decision 
to generate electricity in-house, we use a binary choice model, which is based on the following stochastic 
specification, 
!" #$ = 1 = ' ()*$, (,-$. 																																																																																				(1) 
where #$  is the probability that household 2  invests in a generator, Φ  is the standard normal distribution 
function, *$ represents service attributes (outage time – frequency and duration of outages), -$ is a vector of 
controls, including regional and households characteristics, and . is a standard deviation of normally distributed 
error terms. Equation (1) is estimated using the probit method. The estimated parameters are presented in Table 
2. The results reveal that gender differentials, the level of income, the number of household electrical 
appliances, and the operation of home-based businesses significantly and positively influence a household’s 
ownership of a backup generator. That income significantly influences the decision to own a generator is not 
surprising, because high-income households should be able to afford the cost of procuring a generator. Also, 
rich households are more likely to own more electrical appliances that could only be powered during outages by 
a backup generator. Similarly, those who operate home businesses would be likely to demand backups because 
of the importance of backup generation to their business operation. 
 
Conversely, households living in shared apartments, those that reside in Osun State, and those that live 
in more populated houses have a lower probability of owning a generator. The negative relationship between the 
aforementioned factors and generator ownership might reflect affordability constraints. For instance, households 
sharing apartments are more likely to be poor compared to households who do not reside in shared 
accommodation. Similarly, Osun State’s economy is relatively less developed than Lagos’s, which might 
explain the reason for the low probability of generator ownership among Osun residents. Respondents’ age is 
negatively related to the probability of a household engaging in self-generation. Given decades of poor 
electricity supply in Nigeria, older people were more likely to grow up without electricity, and may have 
adapted to unreliability and found it “more normal” to live without electricity.     
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Table 2: Determinants of Households’ Adoption of Backup Generator  
Dependent variable: household backup 
ownership Coefficient 
Robust 
std. error 
Marginal 
effect 
Male 0.30** (0.12) 0.12 
Income  0.17*** (0.04) 0.07 
Outage time per week (hrs) -0.0001 (0.002) -0.00004 
Number of household appliances 0.11** (0.05) 0.04 
Prepayment (dummy) 0.26 (0.19) 0.10 
Shared house/single room (dummy) -0.41** (0.16) -0.15 
Number of occupants -0.01** (0.006) -0.01 
Economically active (employed=1, 0 
otherwise) 0.28 (0.18) 0.11 
State dummy (Osun=1, 0 otherwise) -0.93*** (0.13) -0.35 
Confident about future improvements (having 
confidence =1, 0 otherwise) -0.04 (0.11) -0.02 
Home business ownership (dummy) 0.31** (0.12) 0.12 
Average hours spent at home per day 0.01 (0.01) 0.002 
Age (years) -0.02*** (0.004) -0.01 
Constant 0.38 (0.44)  
Number of observations 679   
Wald 4, 236.24   5 > 4, 0.000    
Notes: * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; significant at the 1% level. 
The next section investigates the extent to which a household’s engagement in self-generation might 
affect their WTP. 
5. BACKUP GENERATION AND WTP 
5.1 Double-Bounded Choice or Interval Data Model  
 
We use the DBDC model to estimate the determinants of households’ WTP and how (and the extent to 
which) households’ engagement in self-generation might affect their WTP. A double-bounded model retains the 
incentive properties of discrete choice and is also more efficient (M. Hanemann, Loomis, and Kanninen 1991). 
A further advantage of the double-bounded model is that it is fairly robust with respect to poor bid designs 
resulting from initial parameter misspecification (M. Hanemann et al., 1991; Scarpa and Bateman, 2000). In 
effect, the higher second bid provides insurance against too low a choice for the initial bid, and the lower second 
bid provides insurance against too high a choice for the initial bid (M. W. Hanemann and Kanninen, 1998). 
 
In the survey, respondents were offered two rounds of questions, with the second being contingent 
upon the responses to the first. If the response to the first bid	(7$) is no (or yes), the follow-up question used a 
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lower,	7$8, (or a higher,	7$9) bid value. Then, each respondent would be in one of the following categories: ‘yes–
yes’, ‘no–no’, ‘yes–no’, or ‘no–yes’. Assuming a linear WTP function of the form :;!< -<, =< = (-< + =< , 
where 	-<  is a vector of individual household characteristics (e.g., backup ownership status, income or 
appliances) and service attributes, ( is a vector of parameter, and =$< is the individual (household) unobserved 
characteristics, which satisfies =<~@ 0, ., . Under the assumption of a utility-maximising respondent, the log-
likelihood function for the above response categories is:15   
BCDEF ∅ = H$IJBC Φ -< (. − L). − Φ -< (. − L,. + H$IIBC Φ -< (. − L,.M$ + H$JIBC Φ -< (. − L,. − Φ -< (. − L). + H$JJBC 1 − Φ -< (. − L,. 				 2  
Here, L) and L, are the first and second bid amounts respectively. H$OO indicates the response category for each 
respondent:	2, C =P CQP, R = ′RTU′. The maximum likelihood estimator for the double-bounded model,	∅EF, is 
the solution to the equation VBCDEF(∅EF)/V∅	 = 0 . Using the doubleb STATA command developed by 
Lopez-Feldman (2012), we can directly obtain ( and .. Thus, the expected mean WTP from Equation (2) is X :;!|(, - = (P-. 
 
Table 3 shows the results from the estimation of Equation (2) of the relationship between households’ 
engagements in self-generation, service attributes, households’ background characteristics and WTP amount in 
local currency (naira). Selected households’ socioeconomic characteristics included in the regressions were 
informed by the previous studies. Among the socioeconomic factors that have been found to play significant 
roles in WTP for electricity services are income, age, gender, and housing type (Carlsson and Martinsson 2007; 
Abdullah and Jeanty 2011; Abdullah and Mariel 2010), household size, years of residence in the area, 
employment status, and bank account ownership (Abdullah and Jeanty, 2011), billing accuracy, home-business 
ownership, level of education of the head of household, and having more school-going children (Gunatilake, 
Maddipati and Patail, 2012; Gunatilake, Patail and Yang, 2012). Service attributes include the frequency and/or 
duration of outages (Carlsson and Martinsson 2007; Abdullah and Mariel 2010; Carlsson and Martinsson 2008).  
 
We estimate four models in total: the first two models include a dummy variable, indicating whether a 
household engages in self-generation, but differ on how service attributes are treated. The first model includes 
the number of weekly outages and the duration of outages separately, while the second model combines the two 
																																								 																				
15 See Haab and McConnell (2002) for details. 
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attributes and treats them as outage time. Instead of a self-generation dummy, the third and the fourth models 
include self-generation fuel cost per hour (fuel costs) to capture the effect of backup generation on WTP. To test 
whether the ownership of household electrical appliances influenced WTP, the number of electrical appliances 
owned by a household is included in the models.16  
 
The estimated results show that, with all else being equal, households do not separate the impact of 
outage frequency and duration when making WTP decisions (Table 3).17 Rather, households are more concerned 
about the total length of outages (outage time) that they suffered.18 Thus, we subsequently focus our discussion 
on the estimates from the models, including outage time (i.e., Models 2 and 4).19 In general, consumers who 
own generators experience longer blackout times, pay for their electricity upfront (prepaid), are economically 
active, are confident about future service improvements, and are willing to pay more to enjoy a better service. 
More importantly, both the generator ownership dummy and the per-hour fuel cost of self-generation are 
significantly related to WTP for service reliability (at 5 per cent and 1 per cent significant level), suggesting that 
self-generation positively influences WTP.  
 
Conversely, households living in a single room or shared house, and those who spent long hours at 
home, were less willing to pay for service improvements. We also found that households in Osun State were less 
willing to pay compared to their counterparts in Lagos. Surprisingly, however, the number of electrical 
appliances held by households does not significantly influence their WTP for reliability. This might be because 
most of their appliances are small and are already being run on a generator. This perception is further reinforced 
by a significant correlation between backup ownership and the number of electrical appliances held by a 
household (see Table 2). In terms of the absolute size of the effects, the coefficient on backup generator 
ownership indicates that engagement in backup generation significantly increased WTP extra on top of the 
monthly bill by N220.13 (US$1.42). Similarly, an additional N1 (US$0.006) increase in self-generation’s fuel 
cost per hour is associated with a WTP N5.22 (US$0.034) on top of the monthly electricity bill.  
																																								 																				
16 We also test for the effect of household energy appliances by re-estimating our model to include monthly energy consumption instead of 
the number of appliances. The results do not vary significantly; the coefficient of energy consumption is not significant, while the 
coefficients of other variables are consistent with the earlier estimates in terms of both magnitude and significance levels. 
17 We run another set of regressions that controlled for community effects by including community (i.e., sampling area) dummies. The 
results did not show significant differences in the coefficients of most of the key variables. However, most of the coefficients on the 
community dummies were not significant enough to warrant reportage. Moreover, log-likelihood ratio tests indicate that the models that 
controlled for state-level effects are better than the models that controlled for community-level effects. Therefore, we stick to the models 
that control for regional differences through state dummies.  
18 Frequency and duration of outages do not significantly influence WTP individually, but have a joint effect when they are considered in 
terms of the total outage time. We excluded the variable for education level, as it did not improve the performance of the models. Instead, it 
distorted the models’ performance significantly. Also, the interaction of some variables, such as income with generator ownership, home-
business ownership with generator ownership, appliances with generator ownership, and hours spent at home with generator ownership did 
not improve the results. Both the coefficient of the treatment variable and those of the interactions were insignificant. 
19 Although the log-likelihood ratio test suggests no significant difference between the two models, Model 2 is judged to be better, 
considering the significance of the variables. 
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For robustness purposes, Table B1 in Appendix B provides sets of regression results where we delete 
one control variable at a time, in order to be more confident that the results (e.g., the effects of self-generation 
on WTP) are not driven by unobservables related to our control variables. We see that the results are statistically 
significant in all cases and the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are relatively stable. 
 
Table 3: Determinants of WTP for Improved Reliability 
 Double-bound Double-bound 
Dependent variable: WTP (Naira) Model1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Male 37.17   
(98.68) 
38.22   
(98.44) 
26.72  
(97.84) 
28.53 
(97.58) 
Generator Ownership (dummy)  211.90**  
(107.21) 
220.13**  
(106.78) 
  
Fuel cost per hours   5.18*** 
(1.41) 
5.22*** 
(1.39) 
Income  -7.02  
(33.88) 
-2.44   
(33.80) 
-23.05 
(34.08) 
-18.76 
(34.00) 
Frequency of outages 6.52    
(5.24) 
 5.86 
(5.22) 
 
Duration of outage (hrs) 10.40   
(17.42) 
 9.56 
(17.31) 
 
Outage time per week  3.30** 
(1.27) 
 3.24** 
(1.27) 
Number of household appliances 16.70   
(38.17) 
18.09   
(37.89) 
14.24 
(37.80) 
16.37 
(37.53) 
Prepayment (dummy) 417.76** 
(149.52) 
418.46***   
(147.11) 
430.24*** 
(148.49) 
428.23*** 
(146.07) 
Shared house/single room (dummy) -333.60** 
(130.91) 
-308.04**  
(130.82) 
-312.65** 
(130.07) 
-287.49** 
(129.91) 
Number of occupants 5.79  
(5.17) 
5.42    
(5.16) 
6.19 
(5.13) 
5.81 
(5.12) 
Economically active (employed=1, 0 
otherwise) 
271.17  
(146.13) 
255.73*  
(145.57) 
250.55* 
(145.21) 
235.31 
(144.61) 
State dummy (Osun=1, 0 otherwise) -195.72*  
(114.68) 
-204.12*   
(113.32) 
-182.16 
(110.84) 
-194.24* 
(109.50) 
Confident about future improvements 
(having confidence =1, 0 otherwise) 
321.25***  
(93.97) 
366.03***  
(93.15) 
325.67*** 
(93.43) 
370.41*** 
(92.61) 
Home business ownership (dummy) 39.64   
(97.62) 
46.23    
(97.25) 
33.62 
(96.81) 
40.05 
(96.45) 
Average hours spent at home per day -18.29*  
(10.67) 
-17.82*  
(10.64) 
-18.70* 
(10.61) 
-18.32* 
(10.58) 
Age (years) -0.16  
(3.23) 
-0.37   
(3.22) 
-0.31 
(3.17) 
-0.54 
(3.16) 
Constant 779.67** 
(387.58) 
677.88*  
(367.63) 
831.88** 
(380.96) 
723.04** 
(359.38)  
Log-likelihood = -315.29 -315.22 -874.82 -872.15 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 presents the estimates of the mean WTP based on the results from Table 3. On average, 
consumers were willing to pay between N956.60 (US$6.16) and N1,160.72 (US$7.48) on top of their monthly 
bill to reduce the incidence of power outages to half of its present level. Given the weekly outage time of about 
72 hours, which translates to a monthly average of 288 hours, the average household was willing to pay an 
additional N7.35 (US$0.05) per one-hour reduction in outage time. This translates to a WTP N10.36 (US$0.07) 
on top of the current tariff to enjoy an extra kWh.20 This means that the average Nigerian household would be 
willing to pay N23.37 (US$0.15) per kWh of additional reliability.21 As evidenced in Table 4, and similar to 
Table 3, the mean WTP estimate suggests that, on average, backup households would be willing to pay around 
N220.13 (US$1.42) more than non-backup households.22 In other words, a backup household would be willing 
to pay around 23.6 per cent more than the WTP amount per kWh of a non-backup household, and around 20.8 
per cent more than the WTP of an average respondent in our sample. With a typical average monthly bill of 
N5,038.05 (US$32.45), this means that engagement in backup generation alone accounts for a WTP an 
additional 4.4 per cent of the current electricity bill monthly. These findings illustrate that, despite people’s 
willingness to enjoy a better electricity service, the differences between backup and non-backup households are 
significant. We re-examine the robustness of this finding in the next section using a matching approach before 
explaining our perception. 
Table 4: Estimated Mean WTP per Month on Top of Current Bill  
 Expected WTP 
(Naira) 
Lower bound Upper bound 
Double bound 1,058.81 
(US$6.82) 
971.69 
(US$6.26) 
1,145.93 
(US$7.38) 
WTP (Naira) from double-bounded model by consumers' characteristics 
  Lagos Osun Weighted avg. 
WTP on top of monthly bills (baseline estimates) 1,160.72 
(US$7.48) 
956.60 
(US$6.16) 
1,058.81 
(US$6.82) 
Backup households 1,256.36 
(US$8.09) 
1,052.24 
(US$6.78) 
1,154.44 
(US$7.44) 
Non-backup households 1,036.23 
(US$6.67) 
832.11 
(US$5.36) 
934.31 
(US$6.02) 
Prepaid customers 1,530.45 
(US$9.79) 
1,326.37 
(US$8.54) 
1,428.55 
(US$9.20) 
Post-paid customers 1,112.03 
(US$7.16) 
907.92 
(US$5.85) 
1,010.48 
(US$6.51) 
Note: Official exchange rate at the time of the survey was N155.25: US$1. 
 
																																								 																				
20 To compute the average kWh of electricity consumed per hour, we divided the average monthly electricity consumption by the average 
hours of electricity availability per month. This yielded an average of 0.71kWh per hour.  
21 Nigeria currently operates a multi-tariff rate-per-kWh system that ranges from N12.30 to N16.00 for residential consumers, depending on 
their category. The categories used by the service provider include whether a house is only residential, somewhat commercial, highly 
commercial, etc. The average tariff for our sample at that time was N13.01. 
22 This difference is obtained by comparing the weighted WTP amount for backup households with that of non-backup households. 
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5.2 Alternative Estimation Method – A Matching Approach 
In this section, we use a matching method as an alternative estimator. One concern is that the impact of 
owning a generator (on WTP) may not be homogenous across households, but, rather, may vary as a function of 
the (observed and unobserved) characteristics of the households. For instance, generators may be less productive 
in (or less useful to) a household that either lacks the financial capacity to (fully) finance the operation of the 
generator (e.g., due to the inability to fuel the generator) or whose energy demand is low. In this case, simple 
double-bounded model regression estimates may be biased. The first bias arises when there are some households 
that have invested in backup generation, but there are no comparable households without such investments, and 
vice versa. The second bias may arise from different distributions of the vector of observable variables (Z) that 
affect WTP within the two groups of households. 
Matching methods eliminate these two potential sources of bias by pairing backup households 
(treatments) with non-backup households (controls) that have similar observed characteristics. The first source 
of concern can be eliminated using observations in the treatment and control groups over the region of common 
support in the distribution of Z , whereas the bias arising from different distributions of Z  between treated 
(backup) and untreated (non-backup) households within this common support can be eliminated by reweighting 
the control group observations (i.e., by using kernel matching). The underlying assumption in matching 
estimation is that, conditional on the observed characteristics	Z, the counterfactual outcome distribution of the 
treated units is the same as the observed outcome distribution of the units in the control group.  
The objective in matching is to construct a group by finding non-backup households (controls) that 
have observed characteristics ZU similar to those of the backup households (treatments). Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) have shown that matching treated and untreated subjects on the basis of ZU is similar to matching them 
using a balancing score	7(Z). The balancing score is the propensity score that gives the conditional probability 
of receiving treatment (i.e., owning a backup), given the pre-treatment values of the vector Z – that is,	! Z =! ; = 1 Z . Thus, the matching technique assumes that, conditional on 	!(Z) , the counterfactual outcome 
distribution of the treated subjects is the same as the observed outcome distribution of the controls. This 
propensity score-matching procedure reduces the potential problem, from matching on high-dimensional vector Z of the observed characteristics to matching on a scalar. 
 
We estimate propensity scores from a logit model of the probability that a household owns a backup 
generator conditional on the household’s and service’s characteristics, and then, conditional on the probability, 
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we predict the WTP differential between the backup and non-backup households.23 We identify control and 
treatment observations on a common support as follows. We exclude all control observations whose propensity 
scores are less than the propensity score of the treatment households at the 10th percentile of the treatment 
propensity score distribution, and exclude all treatment observations whose propensity score is greater than the 
propensity score of the control observation at the 18th percentile of the control distribution. Then, we estimate 
differences in WTP on the observations that lie on this common support, using both the nearest neighbour and 
kernel density weighting matching estimators.  
 
Table 5 presents the WTP differential obtained from the two matching algorithms. The results from 
both the kernel and nearest neighbour matching estimators confirm our earlier findings. On average, the results 
show that households owning backup generators would be willing to pay between N211.42 (US$1.36) and 
N296.71 (US$1.91) – in additional WTP per month – more than comparable non-backup households. This 
finding is robust to different specifications of the propensity score and different matching estimators. 
Specifically, we found that the common support estimates are similar to full sample results: the average effects 
of using a backup generator, using the nearest neighbour and kernel algorithms, were N301.42 (US$1.94) and 
N211.97 (US$1.37) respectively. When comparing households with similar characteristics, the households 
owning backup generators would be willing to pay more than households that had not invested in backup 
generation. These findings reinforce the earlier findings and confirm that self-generation is positively associated 
with WTP. To examine the sensitivity of our findings to unobserved components, we examine the degree to 
which our findings might be affected by the unobserved components. The results suggest that, indeed, self-
generation is positively related to WTP – see Appendix D for details on the procedures and the results obtained 
from the test for unobserved component effects. 
 
Table 5: Differences Between Backup and Non-Backup Households’ Stated Monthly WTP Amount – Matching 
Methods 
 Full sample Common support 
  
Nearest 
neighbour Kernel estimator 
Nearest 
neighbour 
Kernel estimator 
Average treatment effect 
on the Treated 
296.71 
(109.38) 
211.42 
(100.16) 
301.42  
(109.42) 
211.97  
 (99.21) 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; 500 replications used. 
 
 
																																								 																				
23 We estimate several logit regressions and select the one that satisfies the balancing properties assumption. 
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6. MARGINAL COST OF OUTAGE AND WTP 
6.1. Self-Generation (Outage) Costs and WTP – A Simple Method  
	
The key finding from the analysis of WTP in the previous section is that households engaging in self-
generation would be willing to pay more than those without. An obvious question that arises from this finding 
is: What does it cost to generate a kWh at home? Or, put differently: What is the cost of outage to households? 
This question is pertinent because the cost of backup generation would serve as the immediate measure of the 
cost of the electricity service that is available to backup households but not available to non-backup households. 
An explanation for the finding that backup households express a higher WTP than non-backup households could 
be that self-generation is more expensive, which they take into account when making WTP decisions. We 
investigate how much it costs a household to generate its own electricity as a way of understanding why backup 
households would express greater WTP. For this analysis, we use the information on backup generation reported 
by households in our sample. During the survey, respondents were asked to indicate whether they had a backup 
generator. They were also asked to provide information on the purchase and operating costs, year of acquisition 
and capacity of the generator.24 In total, around 55 per cent of the sampled households reported owning a 
backup generator. 
 
In making a decision, households have to choose the optimal amount of backup power by considering a 
generator’s energy load and the welfare impact of the unserved energy. A rational household will maximise the 
expected marginal benefits from generating a kWh from its plant by equating at the margin the expected cost of 
generating the kWh to the expected benefit from that kWh. This benefit consists of the utility derivable from the 
continued lighting, television watching, radio listening, cooking, and cooling (even if partial) made possible by 
self-generated electricity, and the reduction in welfare loss that would have resulted from power interruptions. 
The marginal cost of self-generation serves as an estimate for marginal outage costs because the expected 
marginal gain from self-generation equals the expected welfare loss from the kWh not supplied by the utility 
provider.  
 
A household’s cost of generating its own electricity is formed of two components. The first is the 
annual capacity cost of a generator. This cost is denoted by [#, where #	represents the generator’s capacity in 
kW. The second cost component is the operating expenses – the variable cost per kWh. This is mainly the cost 
of fuel and is practically constant, given the assumption that the generator is used at full capacity during power 
																																								 																				
24 Capacity was reported in kVA but converted into kW, given that 1kVA=0.8kW at full capacity. 
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outages. Thus, the yearly variable cost will be \*#, where \ is the fuel cost per kWh and * (measured in hours) 
is the expected total hours, per annum, during which a household self-generates electricity.25 The total annual 
expected cost (in kW) is the sum of the yearly generator and variable cost: ] # = [# + \*#																																																																																																																									 3  
The expected marginal cost (US$/kWh) of self-generated electricity can be written as: 
] ′ # _`9 = [′#* + \																																																																																																																						 4  
Equation (4) can be used to compute the marginal cost of self-generation using data on a household’s 
acquisition and running cost of self-generation, and the duration of power outages. To achieve this result, values 
for [′, * and \ must be obtained. This method was proposed for the estimation of firms’ (marginal) outage costs 
by Bental and Ravid (1982). Applying Equation (4) to data on backup generation allows us (using reasonable 
assumptions) to estimate the (marginal) cost of self-generation from the observed information about the 
acquisition and running costs of generating capacity, as well as from data on power outages.26 The unit cost of 
capital of self-generated electricity, [′, depends on price schedules for generators, tax and depreciation rules, 
and interest rates. Original price schedules and data on the year of acquisition were reported during the survey. 
First, the price schedules were converted to 2012 prices using the corresponding values of the consumer price 
index. We then obtained the capital cost per kW of installed capacity (assuming no tax rules, a 15-year life span 
and an interest rate of 10 per cent).27  For * , we used the generator operating hours reported by backup 
households.28 
               Table 6 presents the estimated costs of self-generation (i.e., outage costs) based on Equation (4), the 
average electricity prices and the estimated average WTP amount by backup households. The estimates show 
that the average WTP is higher than the grid electricity price, but smaller than the marginal cost of self-
generation by backup households. The key result is that households pay US$0.08/kWh for grid supplies but are 
willing to pay US$0.16/kWh, since it costs up to US$0.41/kWh to generate electricity at home. There are two 
																																								 																				
25 Unlike previous studies which used outage times, we use generator operating hours reported by households. This gives better estimates of 
outage cost than outage times because some generator owners might not operate their generators throughout the outage period. A factor that 
can limit generation operation is the budget constraint. 
26 This measure of marginal cost does not account for any additional welfare loss that may result from incomplete backup. Such welfare loss 
may include damage to home appliances and food spoilage. 
27 The annualised capital cost	b]]	 = 	] ∗ " [1 − 1 + " eM],	where ]	is the generator cost,	" is the discount rate and @ is the generator’s 
life span. 
28 Instead of making an assumption that households operate their generators throughout the outage periods, we use the reported operating 
hours. Using the actual operating time reported by consumers improves the accuracy of the estimates because several factors (e.g., budget 
constraint) might prevent them from running their generators throughout outage period. Thus, using outage time based on the assumption 
that households operate their generators throughout outage period would underestimate the generation cost. 
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possible explanations for this finding. The first intuition is that backup households do run their generator to 
power some of their most valuable appliances, and the stated WTP is for the non-operated appliances that are 
less valuable; thus, they spend a higher amount on running the most valuable appliances but would be willing to 
pay less than the cost of running the most valuable appliances to run the less valuable, non-operated appliances. 
               The second possible explanation relates to the WTP behaviour of both the backup and non-backup 
households: the backup households would be willing to pay more than non-backup households because the 
marginal cost of self-generation (i.e., outage cost), which is more expensive, serves as an immediately 
observable measure of WTP that is not available to non-backup households. In other words, backup households 
used the marginal cost of self-generation as their reference price upon which their WTP decision was based. 
Intuitively, backup households are willing to pay more than non-backup households because their reference 
prices (i.e., self-generation costs) are higher than those of non-backup households (who pay the grid price). 
However, they are willing to pay less than their reference prices (self-generation costs) in order to avoid 
transaction disutility.29 
 
 Table 6: Comparison of the (Marginal) Costs of Self-generation and the Expected WTP Amount by Backup 
Households 
Note: Official exchange rate at the time of the survey was N155.25: US$1. 
 
6.2 Marginal Cost of Reliability Improvement due to Backup Generation – A Regression Approach  
In this section we set up a household’s optimisation problem and estimate the marginal cost of (i.e., the 
revealed WTP for) reliability improvement due to backup generator ownership using data on households’ 
investment in backup generation.30 This follows the approach by Caves et al. (1992), Hartman et al. (1991) and 
Matsukawa and Fujii (1994).  
Let b represent the per kWh cost with backup generation ownership and be equal to the sum of the per 
kWh cost of owning and operating a backup generator, #, the per kWh rate charged by the local supplier, !, and 
the per kWh outage cost g which depends on the reliability with backup and household characteristics. For a 
																																								 																				
29 See Thaler (1985) and Weaver and Frederick (2012) for a detailed discussion on consumer behaviour and reference prices.  
30 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this part of analysis be included. 
State 
(Marginal) 
variable cost  
(per kWh) 
Unit capital cost 
(per kWh) 
Total (marginal) 
cost (per kWh) 
Grid price 
(average) (per 
kWh) 
Expected avg. WTP 
amount per kWh 
Lagos 59.07(US$0.38) 2.50(US$0.02) 61.57(US$0.40) 13.28(US$0.09) 25.30(US$0.16) 
Osun 52.10(US$0.34) 4.21(US$0.03) 56.32(US$0.36) 12.48(US$0.08) 23.30(US$0.15) 
Overall 57.03(US$0.37) 3.00(US$0.02) 60.03(US$0.39) 13.01(US$0.08) 24.30(US$0.16) 
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non-backup household, let 7 represent the per kWh cost without backup generation ownership and be equal to 
the sum of the per kWh rate charged by the local supplier, !, and the per kWh outage cost h which depends on 
the grid reliability and household characteristics.	 A household adopts backup generation if b	 < 	7, implying (#	 + 	g	– 	h) 	< 	0 because ! is the same for b and 7. Thus, data on backup generation ownership can be used 
to infer the WTP for a marginal reliability improvement. 
Suppose that a household 2′s utility function is represented by a binary choice model as: 
    k$ = (#$ + lm$ + no$ + =$																																																																																																																				 5 ,	 
where # is as previously defined, m denotes the reliability improvement due to backup generation ownership, o 
represents all other controls which might affect the household’s utility, while =  is the error term. By 
differentiating equation (5) and set qk = 0 , the (revealed) WTP for (or the marginal cost of) a marginal 
reliability improvement due to backup generation is  q# qm = −( l . Using data on the per kWh cost of 
owning and operating a backup generator, generator’s operating hours, the grid reliability, and other control 
variables including household demographics, we estimate equation (5) by maximum likelihood estimator. On 
average, the marginal cost of (or marginal WTP for) reliability improvement due to backup generation is 
estimated to be N52.54 (US$0.34) per kWh (see Table 7).31  
Table 7 summarizes the WTP obtained from the survey data analysis (i.e., based on the stated 
preference), the estimated marginal costs of reliability from backup generation (i.e., based on the two forms of 
the revealed preference approach) and the grid electricity prices. On average, the estimated marginal costs of 
reliability improvement (i.e., a measure of the revealed WTP) are more than double the stated WTP and are 
more than four times the (currently subsidised) grid electricity prices. The results show that although households 
would be willing to pay roughly twice the current tariff rates to enjoy better reliability, their stated WTP is 
substantially lower than the marginal cost of improved reliability from self-generation.    
 
 
 
																																								 																				
31 For reasons of space we do not report the regression results from which this figure was estimated. 
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Table 7: Comparison of Estimated Outage Costs/WTP Per kWh 
Note: Official exchange rate at the time of the survey was N155.25: US$1. 
The extent to which our results can be compared to estimates obtained in studies conducted in other 
developing countries is limited for several reasons. First, not many studies have used the revealed preference 
method (e.g., backup generation) to estimate the value of unreliability at household level. Second, the majority 
of studies that estimate households’ WTP for reliability in developing countries report the WTP per hour instead 
of per kWh (see for example Abdullah and Mariel, 2010; Ozbafli and Jenkins, 2016). Nevertheless, our results 
are compared to those of studies that report their estimates in per kWh, regardless of the level of development of 
the countries studied. Our stated WTP estimates, which range between US$0.15/kWh–0.16/kWh depending on 
backup ownership and the state of residence, are reasonably close to US$0.14/kWh (2013 prices) obtained in 
Twerefou (2014)’s study of Ghanaian households. However, our estimated stated WTP (i.e., US$0.15/kWh–
0.16/kWh) and the marginal costs of reliability from self-generation (i.e., US$0.27–0.41/kWh) are substantially 
lower than US$2.99–16.44/kWh (2013 prices) obtained in a study of Israeli households (Beenstock et al., 1998). 
Meanwhile our estimates fall within the lower end of the wide range of US$0.04–26.70/kWh (2013 prices) 
reported in Caves, Herriges, and Windle (1990), but are clearly lower than US$2.79–7.23/kWh (2013 prices) 
obtained in a study of California residential consumers (Layton and Moeltner 2005). 
The differences in the WTP and outage cost estimates may be attributed to different factors including 
valuation techniques, econometric methods, functional formulation, service attributes, and socio-economic and 
demographic variables included in the econometric analyses. The level of trust in the electricity authority might 
also account for the differences in the WTP values (Abdullah and Mariel, 2010). In particular, the WTP is often 
lower in countries where previous price increases were not matched with improved service quality (Townsend 
2000). 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
                We have studied consumers’ WTP and explored the role of in-house generation in households’ WTP 
for electricity reliability in Nigeria. We found that having a generator tended to increase (rather than decrease) 
households’ WTP. This is despite the fact that having and using a generator could potentially reduce the welfare 
 Stated Preference Revealed Preference: Marginal cost    
State Stated WTP Simple method  Regression method   Grid price (average)  
Lagos 25.30(US$0.16) 61.57(US$0.40)  63.37(US$0.41)   13.28(US$0.09) 
Osun 23.30(US$0.15) 56.32(US$0.36)  42.39(US$0.27)   12.48(US$0.08) 
Overall 24.30(US$0.16) 60.03(US$0.39)  52.54(US$0.34)   13.01(US$0.08) 
23	
	
impact of power unreliability. Further exploration of the link between the marginal (outage) cost of self-
generation and backup households’ WTP decisions, however, revealed that the significantly high cost of self-
generation (outage cost) might be responsible for the observed WTP behaviour of the backup households. The 
decision by backup households to pay more appears to be driven by rational behaviour, because paying more to 
enjoy reliability would mean having extra benefits – i.e., enjoying extra reliability at a lower cost than that of 
self-generation. 
                Moreover, the finding that backup households are willing to pay more than non-backup households 
and that what they are willing to pay is less than the cost of self-generation is consistent with the transaction 
utility/value theory (Thaler 1985). The intuition behind this observed behaviour is that backup households are 
willing to pay more than non-backup households because their average reference price (i.e., self-generation cost) 
is higher than the average reference price (i.e., current tariff) for non-backup households due to their experience 
with self-generation costs. Backup households, however, express a WTP that is lower than their self-generation 
costs in order to make some gains by paying an amount below their reference price (self-generation cost). 
                 A number of policy recommendations emerged from our findings. Assessing how households value 
improved services is important for understanding consumer preferences for proposed service improvements, 
which, in turn, is essential for making decisions regarding the planning of electricity service reliability. For this 
study, the estimated mean WTP shows that Nigerian households, regardless of their income, would be willing to 
pay an extra amount (up to 86 per cent) above the current tariff for improved service quality. This implies that 
households would value the reliability of a more expensive supply above the current highly subsidised tariffs 
that come with low quality.  
                 To the extent that consumer WTP can be inferred to be a measure of the welfare impact of 
unreliability on consumers, it is therefore incumbent on the government or regulator to ensure a steady increase 
in the quality of electricity supply and then recover the costs through higher charges. One way forward would be 
for the government to consider optimal tariffs that are cost recovering for new investment and regulatory 
incentives for reliability. The implementation of such price reforms would encourage private investments in 
electricity provision and raise reliability. At the very least, the ‘open’ subsidy regime currently operated needs to 
be replaced by targeted subsidies designed to protect only the low-income and vulnerable groups. This could be 
in the form of cash transfer to deserving households based on a set benchmark. Alternatively, the government 
could use the subsidies removed from electricity tariffs to finance another benefit scheme (e.g., a school feeding 
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programme), or use it to subsidise the uptake of environmentally friendly renewable energy generation, 
including solar photovoltaic power plus storage as an alternative to both the grid and diesel generators. 
                 The estimation of outage (self-generation) cost in this study provides insights into the cost imposed 
on households of poor electricity services and the households’ preferences for improved electricity service 
performance, which, in turn, can help policymakers in terms of reliability investment planning. The cost 
imposed on households by unreliable power is very high, and many households demonstrate high WTP for 
reliable power through stated preferences and their investments in (expensive) self-generation. There is 
therefore a market for more expensive and higher quality power supply. It should be possible to strike a bargain 
between the government and private sector to the effect that households pay higher price for grid power to fund 
investments that will make their power supply more reliable. Lastly, another policy option for the government is 
to implement rising block tariffs, where prices are differentiated over a set block of units such that the first block 
unit is priced lower compared to the subsequent consumption block(s). It was found that ownership of a backup 
generator is correlated with ownership of household appliances. Thus, since those who own many appliances are 
more likely to consume more energy, rising block tariffs are a plausible option for policymakers to consider.  
                 This study is not without limitations, however. The issue of endogeneity and the limited nature of our 
dataset constitute two potential limitations to the analyses presented in this paper. It is possible that engagement 
in self-generation is endogenously determined. For example, certain factors (e.g., energy demand) may jointly 
influence both the decision to engage in backup generation and WTP. However, instrumental variable (IV) 
methods allow consistent estimation when there is an endogeneity problem, though the credibility of the 
estimates from a regression using IV methods hinges on the selection of suitable instruments that do not violate 
the underlying IV conditions.32 If these conditions are violated then the IV method may create more problems 
than it solves. Since we could not find suitable IVs for our analyses, we chose not to use IV methods in this 
study. The analyses, however, deal to some extent with this potential problem by estimating an alternative 
specification by (1) using fuel cost per hour instead of a generator ownership dummy, and (2) applying 
matching methods and testing for unobservable components’ effects. Nevertheless, future studies should 
consider an IV regression specification using credible instruments when examining the effects of self-generation 
on WTP. Finally, a nationally representative survey should be considered in order to overcome the limitation of 
a restricted dataset. 
																																								 																				
32	The two main requirements for using an IV are: (1) the instrument must be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, 
conditional on the other covariates; and (2) the instrument cannot be correlated with the error term in the explanatory equation – that is, the 
instrument cannot suffer from the same problem as the original predicting variable.	
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Nigeria Electricity Sector – Overview 
In spite of various reform steps that have been undertaken in the Nigeria electricity sector, not much 
progress has been recorded. At 6500 MW, the total installed capacity of Nigeria’s public electricity grid meets 
30% of requirements, at best, and only about half of this available capacity is often generated (EIA, 2012), due 
to ageing and poorly maintained generating, transmission and distribution facilities (World Bank 2003). Figure 
A.1 shows the implied installed capacity factor, per capita net generation and consumption of electricity in 
Nigeria from 1980-2012. The implied installed capacity factor indicates that the Nigeria power plants had been 
operating less than 50% of full capacity until 2012 when it attained the all-time high capacity factor of just 51%. 
This implies that despite having inadequate installed capacity to cater for its population, the performance of the 
meagre available capacity has remained abysmally poor. The country’s per capita electricity consumption 
remains less than 150 kWh per annum. The implication of this inadequate generating capacity is that a large 
number of Nigerians do not have access to electricity and that those who have access still battle with unreliable 
supply and frequent blackouts. Apart from the lack of access to electricity for a large proportion of the 
population, which currently stands at about 60% (see Eleri et al., 2012), constant power outages remain a 
common experience among Nigeria’s electrified households. The average Nigerian household experiences 
power outages more than three times a day. These outages last about four hours on average.33  
 
 
																																								 																				
33 The outage time ranges from eight minutes to 22 hours a day.  
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Figure A.1: Nigeria Electricity Supply 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=NI#elec 
Given this high level of unreliability, households in Nigeria have adopted different strategies to cope 
with the poor public provision. Some of these response adjustments include the use of kerosene lamps, kerosene 
stoves, rechargeable lamps, gas lamps, torches and self-generation through backup generators.34 Although many 
of these responses are observable among Nigerian households, the most common and closest substitute for 
electricity from the public grid is self-generation. 35  Many households now operate small generators with 
capacity ranging from 0.4 kW to 8 kW. However, it is not clear whether this self-generation undermines 
households’ WTP for service improvements from the national grid. 
																																								 																				
34 These were the alternatives reportedly used by respondents during the survey when we asked them how they 
manage to cope with blackouts.  
35 More than 50% of households in our sample indicated that they had at least one generator, with some 
households having as many as three generators. Even among the households that stated that they didn’t have a 
generator, many of them told us that their fellow tenants have them.  
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Appendix B: Effects of Backup Ownership on WTP 
Table B1: Effects of backup ownership on WTP  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Generator 
Ownership (dummy) 
220.13**  
(106.78) 
222.20** 
(105.30) 
228.23** 
(105.51) 
228.74** 
(105.15) 
224.19** 
(106.27) 
282.72** * 
(102.38) 
306.49*** 
(102.40) 
305.10*** 
(102.62) 
338.82*** 
(102.10) 
379.28*** 
(101.94) 
403.08*** 
(100.35) 
395.62*** 
(100.44) 
471.95*** 
(94.11) 
478.53*** 
(93.74) 
Male 38.22   (98.44) 
36.96 
(97.69) 
87.62     
(93.77) 
86.50 
(91.71) 
103.18  
(92.55) 
97.46 
(92.85) 
67.52     
(92.46) 
67.03   
(92.67) 
64.59    
(93.06) 
61.24   
(93.62) 
59.70   
(93.75) 
56.90  
(93.92) 
69.37   
(94.13)  
Income  -2.44   (33.80) 
-3.24 
(33.41) 
-0.58  
(33.47) 
-0.59  
(33.48) 
-5.84  
(33.77) 
10.78  
(32.78) 
20.37   
(32.69) 
23.63  
(32.70) 
49.42   
(30.82) 
56.70*  
(30.91) 
66.33**  
(29.99) 
61.75** 
(29.94)   
Outage time per week 3.30** (1.27) 
3.30** 
(1.27) 
3.28** 
(1.28) 
3.28** 
(1.27) 
2.14*  
(1.25) 
1.90     
(1.25) 
2.06   
(1.25) 
2.12*    
(1.26) 
2.36*    
(1.26) 
2.60** 
(1.26) 
2.47*  
(1.26)    
Number of household 
appliances 
18.09   
(37.89) 
18.80 
(37.36) 
20.63 
(37.47) 
20.56  
(37.45) 
24.65  
(37.83) 
34.62   
(37.63) 
28.16   
(37.72) 
40.48   
(36.79) 
43.78   
(36.90) 
46.14  
(37.10)     
Prepayment (dummy) 418.46***   (147.11) 
419.37*** 
(147.02) 
417.84*** 
(147.43) 
418.30*** 
(147.21) 
412.83*** 
(148.75) 
461.82*** 
(147.25) 
431.91*** 
(147.27) 
419.01*** 
(147.34) 
426.84*** 
(147.97)      
Shared house/single 
room (dummy) 
-308.04**  
(130.82) 
-307.28** 
(130.79) 
-304.49** 
(131.10) 
-304.29** 
(131.06) 
-341.52** 
(131.99) 
-377.49*** 
(131.23) 
-344.10*** 
(131.05) 
-276.50**  
(122.16)        
Number of occupants 5.42    (5.16) 
5.46     
(5.14) 
5.48      
(5.15) 
5.49    
(5.15) 
5.23   
(5.20) 
6.70     
(5.16) 
7.31   
(5.18)        
Economically active 
(employed=1, 0 
otherwise) 
255.73*  
(145.57) 
260.54* 
(141.06) 
324.75** 
(137.03) 
325.54** 
(136.34) 
361.85** 
(137.59) 
336.16**  
(137.49)         
State dummy 
(Osun=1, 0 otherwise) 
-204.12*   
(113.32) 
-203.26 
(112.51) 
-209.75* 
(112.80) 
-209.45* 
(112.68) 
-219.87* 
(113.78)          
Confident about future 
improvements (having 
confidence =1, 0 
otherwise) 
366.03***  
(93.15) 
365.88*** 
(93.12) 
375.97***  
(93.27) 
376.13*** 
(93.22)           
Home business 
ownership (dummy) 
46.23    
(97.25) 
45.77 
(96.98) 
5.45    
(94.57)            
Average hours spent at 
home per day 
-17.82*  
(10.64) 
-18.22* 
(10.22)             
Age (years) -0.37    (3.22)              
Constant 677.88*  (367.63) 
662.18* 
(339.91) 
299.07 
(274.44) 
300.66  
(273.06) 
595.22** 
(264.88) 
414.07* 
(249.17) 
662.61*** 
(228.09) 
653.88*** 
(228.61) 
320.82* 
(176.99) 
302.56*  
(177.96) 
430.85*** 
(144.71) 
625.79*** 
(104.43) 
748.72*** 
(85.72)  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; significant at the 1% level.
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Appendix C:  Protests in WTP   
One problem often associated with CVM is protest zeros or zero bids. Protest zeros or zero bids are 
honest responses provided by low-income respondents and those who hold negative views about the good or 
service being evaluated or refuse to participate in the study (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Generally, a protest 
zero is where respondents state their willingness to pay nothing for a good or service even though they may hold 
a value for it. Protest zeros are a source of concern (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) because researchers often need 
to distinguish between those respondents who hold a value but cannot afford to pay and those who are not 
willing to pay despite holding a value for the good or service in question. For dichotomous-choice questions, 
protest zeros are of particular concern because a ‘no’ or ‘no–no’ response may be misinterpreted as a 
willingness to pay less than the stated amount rather than as a protest. Hence, it is necessary to introduce a 
follow-up question to identify protest-zero respondents (Boyle 2003). 
As highlighted by Halstead, Luloff and Stevens (1992), three principal means are commonly used to 
deal with protest zeros in the literature: (i) drop them from the data set; (ii) assign protest bidders mean WTP 
values based on their socio-demographic characteristics relative to the rest of the sample group; or (iii) treat the 
protest bids as valid zero bids and include them in the data set. A major concern with the first approach is the 
loss of potentially useful information as well as the likely tendency for self-selection bias (Halstead, Luloff, and 
Stevens 1992). The second method suffers from the deviation problem: estimated WTP based on this approach 
may totally deviate from the true value if the socio-demographic characteristics of zero-bidders are different 
from those of the general population.  
A major concern with the third approach (i.e. the inclusion of protest zeros as legitimate bids) is that it 
can downwardly bias the mean WTP estimates. Despite this concern, however, it has been argued that protest 
bids (if they exist) ‘should be considered legitimate WTP bids as respondents are essentially valuing a proposed 
policy, not just a commodity’ (McGuirk, Stephenson and Taylor, 1989, pp 1–2). Following this argument, we 
included ‘no–no’ responses in the estimates of WTP presented in the main paper. However, in order to ascertain 
the level of protest in our study, we introduced an open-ended follow-up question for respondents who answered 
‘no–no’ to the proposed bid questions. The open-ended question asked was ‘You have answered both questions 
A9 and A11 as ‘no–no’. Then, how much would you be willing to pay ___?’ We found that 19.8% of those who 
answered ‘no–no’ to the bid questions (representing 4.1% of the total sample) would be willing to pay nothing. 
A non-response rate of around 20% to 30% is common (Mitchell and Carson, 1989), therefore the non-response 
rate was within acceptable limits under which valid WTP values can be estimated. Moreover, the majority of 
these respondents were from low-income households, suggesting that their stated zero amounts reflected their 
inability to pay rather than a protest (Figure C.1). 
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Figure C.1: Proportion of zero responses by income category 
 
We also estimated the probability of stating zero WTP using the follow-up question responses for the 
‘no–no’ response sample. This was done to better examine the factors responsible for stating zero WTP as a 
mean of further investigating the presence of protest in our analysis. The results showed that income was the 
main determinant of stating a zero bid (Table C.1), implying that our analysis was not or was minimally 
susceptible to protest.  
Table C.1: Probability of stating zero WTP 
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
Male 0.24  
(0.32) 
Prepayment 0.14  
(0.60) 
Generator 0.39  
(0.36) 
State – Osun -0.25  
(0.27) 
Income group -0.36*** 
(0.13) 
Consumer confidence -0.35 
 (0.30) 
Outage time (hrs) per week -0.01* 
(0.004) 
Home business ownership 0.23  
(0.30) 
Shared house/single room -0.23 
 (0.40) 
Hours spent at home -0.05  
(0.04) 
Number of household appliances 0.15 
 (0.12) 
Age 0.01  
(0.01) 
Number of occupants -0.01 
 (0.02) 
Constant 1.25 
(1.02) 
Economically active -0.39  
(0.35) 
    
Number of observations 138   
Log-likelihood  -56.75   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; significant at the 1% level. 
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Table C.2 presents the estimates from the double-bounded model when respondents (4% of the sample) 
who stated zero WTP to the follow-up open ended question were excluded. The signs and significant levels of 
covariates were similar to the estimates (without correcting for zero bids) reported in the main text. However, 
the mean WTP estimate is slightly higher (about 6%) than the mean WTP value for all sample (including zero 
bids) reported in the main paper. This change indicates that, to some extent, zero bids in the estimates slightly 
lowered the WTP values reported in the main paper. 
Table C.2: Results for double-bounded model (excluding zero bids) 
Dependent variable: WTP (Naira) Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
Male 60.85     
(96.51) 
Eco. Active (employed=1, 0 
otherwise) 
121.71   
(146.16) 
Generator Ownership 157.42**  
(74.47) 
State dummy (Osun=1, 0 
otherwise) 
-232.38**   
(110.83) 
Income group -11.28   
(33.00) 
Consumer confidence 310.58***    
(91.42) 
Outage time (hours) per week 2.71**   
(1.25) 
Home business (dummy) 103.47   
(95.72) 
Number of household appliances 23.69   
(37.16) 
Hours spent at home per day -21.96**  
(10.48) 
Prepaid customer 385.67***    
(143.36) 
Age 0.59      
 (3.18) 
Shared house/single room -326.82** 
(128.20) 
Constant 998.99***  
(364.52) 
Number of occupants  4.71   
 (4.30) 
   
Log likelihood = -842.28     
Number of observations       651  Mean Lower bound Upper bound 
WTP (Naira) 1122.02 1036.61 1207.43 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; significant at the 1% level. 
 
Appendix D 
Robustness Checks: Testing for the effects of Unobserved Components in Matching  
We test whether our finding that having a backup generator tends to increase WTP is affected by 
unobserved components. One possible reason for the finding is that the key identification assumption – i.e. the 
assumption that, conditional on all observed household characteristics, whether a household uses a backup 
generator or not is independent of its WTP without a generator – is invalid. This happens because there exist 
some unobserved components that affect both whether a household uses a generator and its WTP for service 
improvements. This could be, for example, a strong but unobserved preference for uninterrupted energy 
services. For instance, if households that have a strong preference for uninterrupted service supply are both 
more likely to use a generator and more likely to state a higher WTP amount if they do not have a generator, 
then the matching estimator may find no negative (or even a positive) effect of having a generator on WTP, 
even if it does in fact have a negative effect.  
We test how much an unobserved behaviour (e.g. preference for regular energy supply) would have to 
influence a household’s decision to use a backup generator and the WTP to significantly change the estimation 
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results. The basic idea is that if it can be demonstrated that all configurations of the unobserved behaviour that 
can reverse the findings can be considered unlikely, we can be confident that the estimates reveal the true effect 
of using a generator on WTP (rather than the combined effect of using a generator and unobserved behaviour – 
say, having a strong preference for regular supply or higher energy demand). 
We used the method first suggested by Ichino et al. (2008) to conduct a robustness test on the results 
using the following steps. We first made different assumptions to characterise the distribution of the unobserved 
component (") in our sample. We then tested under which assumptions of	(") the estimated effect of using a 
generator on WTP became negative. Finally, we discussed the degree of plausibility of these assumptions. The 
key assumption made about the unobserved component (") was that it was independently distributed; i.e. the 
unobservable component was independent of the observed household characteristics. This allowed us – without 
loss of generality (see Ichino et al., 2008) – to specify four sets of parameters that characterised the distribution 
of ("): 
%&& = % " = 1 ) = 1, + = 1, , ; %&. = % " = 1 ) = 1, + = 0, , ; %.& = % " = 1 ) = 0, + = 1, , ; %.. = % " = 1 ) = 0, + = 0, , . 
These give the probability that " = 1	in each of the four groups defined by whether or not households have a 
generator or and whether or not households stated a WTP that was higher than the mean.  
To check the effect of a given distribution of 	" , we fixed %&& − %..  at one given arbitrary (but 
meaningful) value at a time. We then proceeded by attributing a value of "	to each household in the sample 
depending on which of the four groups it belonged to. For example, if %&&	was fixed at 0.65, a value of " = 1 
with probability 0.65 was attributed to each household with a backup generator ) = 1 	and which stated above-
average WTP	(+ = 1). We then estimated the effect of having a generator on WTP, including "	as a further 
observed covariate. We repeated this matching process a large number of times for the given set of values of the 
sensitivity parameters	%&& − %... We obtained an estimate of the effect of having a backup generator as the 
average of the estimated ATT effects over the distribution of the simulated	"s. 
The estimated results from this process are reported in Table D.1. As previously stated, we fixed the 
probabilities %2 " = 1  and the difference 34 = %&& − %..	at pre-determined values. This was done to reduce 
the dimensionality problem of the distribution of	". This enabled us – without loss of generality36 – to describe 
the simulated confounder fully by the difference 3 = %.& − %..	and	5 = %&. − %...37 
																																								 																				
36 Since these terms are not expected to pose a real threat to the baseline estimate, they can be held constant and the simulated confounder " 
can be fully described by the difference	3 = 	%.& − %.. and	5 = %&. − %... 
37 We only consider the positive values of 3 and	5. By setting	%.& > %.., one can simulate a confounding factor that has a positive effect on 
the untreated outcome. Similarly, by assuming	%& > %. , one can simulate a confounding factor that has a positive effect on treatment 
assignment. 
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Table D.1 shows the estimated values of Λ	and	Γ, where Λ	captures the effect of " on the probability 
that a household uses a backup generator (the selection effect) and Γ	represents the effect of " on WTP (the 
outcome effect).38 The key finding from the table is that even if the distribution of "	is characterised in such a 
way that it has a large effect on the probability that a household will use a backup generator (Λ = 7.01) and a 
large effect on WTP	(Γ = 3.95), the estimate of the corresponding effect of using a generator on WTP remains 
positive. To reverse the estimate to have a negative effect of about 211 , "	needs to increase the relative 
probability of owning a generator Λ  by an implausibly large factor greater than 9.72 and the relative 
probability of stating above-mean WTP Γ  by an implausibly large factor greater than 11.20. Also, if "	is 
calibrated to the mimic variable ‘home business ownership’ dummy (a dummy indicating whether a household 
has a home business), we get a selection effect of Λ = 1.25	and an outcome effect of	Γ = 0.90. This suggests 
that it is very unlikely that the finding that owning a backup generator tends to increase WTP is driven by some 
unobserved component. 
	
Table D.1: Average treatment effects from the matching algorithm with an unobserved component 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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